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THE SKY IS STILL NOT FALLING
Richard D. Friedman
Crawford v. Washington1 dramatically transformed the law
governing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution, and much for the better. Under the old regime
associated with Ohio v. Roberts,2 the Clause was little more than
a constitutionalization of the modern law of hearsay,
incorporating its multiple particular oddities and also a general
principle that the law poses no obstacle to admission of an outof-court statement that is deemed by the courts to be reliable.
This doctrine bore no relation to the text or history of the
Confrontation Clause. It reflected no principle worthy of
respect—and in part as a result, it was highly manipulable.
Crawford, by contrast, articulated a simple and robust principle
that is apparent on the face of the Clause and in its history, and
is a central element of our system of criminal adjudication: A
witness against an accused must (unless the accused waives or
forfeits the right) give her testimony in the presence of the
accused, subject to cross-examination. Ordinarily, she must do
so at trial. If she is unavailable to testify then, however, the
accused’s confrontation right will be satisfied if she gave her
testimony on some prior occasion at which he had the
opportunity to be confronted by her and cross-examine her.
Crawford, by razing the old structure of Confrontation
Clause doctrine, left many open questions. Chief among these
was the standard for determining whether an out-of-court
statement that is later offered against an accused should be
deemed to be testimonial—that is, whether the person who made
Alene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School.
1
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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the statement should be deemed to have been acting as a witness
and so within the scope of the Confrontation Clause. I had no
doubt that there would be decades of litigation, including
numerous Supreme Court cases, before the new framework was
completely filled in. But it appeared to me that the basic principle
of Crawford was so obviously correct, so fundamental to our
system, so easy to state and to understand, and so far superior to
what had prevailed before, that prosecutors and judges as well as
those on the defense side would quickly come to accept it.
Silly me. In the eight years since Crawford, many
prosecutors have attempted at every turn to limit its holding.
Lower courts have often used strained reasoning to reach results
that undercut Crawford’s holding. And before the Supreme
Court, most of the states, and sometimes the United States as
well, have joined in, trying to scare the justices into believing
that they will create enormous practical problems if they do not
cut back on Crawford.
Cases since Crawford have mainly fallen into two categories.
One involves accusations of crime, made by the apparent victim
shortly after the incident. In Michigan v. Bryant,3 a majority of
the Court adopted an unfortunately constricted view of the word
“testimonial” in this context. That decision was a consequence of
the Court having failed to adopt a robust view of when an
accused forfeits the confrontation right.4 How the Court will deal
3

Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
In Bryant, Anthony Covington, suffering from severe gunshot wounds,
told the police that Bryant had shot him half an hour before and several
blocks away. Id. at 1150. There was no indication that Covington realized
death was close, but he died several hours later. Id. In my view, the
statement should clearly have been deemed testimonial. Covington did not
make the statement in order to get medical help or stop a crime spree, but to
finger the man who he claimed had shot him. But a holding that Covington’s
statement could not be admitted at a trial of Bryant seems singularly
unappealing. Id. at 1167. Before Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), a
court might have held that Bryant forfeited the confrontation right by
engaging in serious, intentional misconduct that foreseeably rendered
Covington unavailable to appear as a witness at trial. But Giles foreclosed a
decision along those lines. In that case, the Court held that an accused does
not forfeit the confrontation right unless he engaged in the misconduct for the
purpose of rendering the witness unavailable. Giles, 554 U.S. at 368. As a
4
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with this situation—one mistake made in an attempt to compensate
for another—is a perplexing and important question. This Essay,
though, concentrates on the other principal category of postCrawford cases, involving forensic laboratory reports. In this
context, the Supreme Court has, thus far at least, come to what I
believe is the proper result, recognizing that such reports,
prepared for use in investigation and prosecution of crime, are
testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. But in the
most significant cases, the Court has reached this result over the
strenuous dissent of four justices, and over the objections of most
of the states.
MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS
The key case was Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,5 which
held that, at least as a general matter, forensic laboratory reports
are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. I
regarded that basic holding as quite obvious—it was, as Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the majority said, a “rather straightforward
application” of Crawford. But four justices, led by Justice
Kennedy, dissented, and they, together with Massachusetts and
its supporting amici (including the United States, thirty-five
states, the District of Columbia, the National District Attorneys
Association, and numerous local prosecutors), raised a flurry of
arguments in opposition. This gave Justice Scalia a chance to
clear away a good deal of underbrush, as one by one—quite
correctly—he set these arguments aside.
A lab report is ordinarily not accusatory. That does not
matter—the Confrontation Clause is not limited to accusatory
statements. Such a limitation would eviscerate the right,
because in many cases there is no witness who can testify
that she observed the accused committing a crime.
result, the only way the Court could accommodate the powerful, and
understandable, impulse to admit Covington’s statement was to hold that the
statement was non-testimonial. This means that the Confrontation Clause
would pose no obstacle to admission of the statement, even if Covington had
survived and was living around the corner from the courthouse at the time of
trial. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167–68.
5
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
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An analyst who prepares a lab report is not an “ordinary” or
“conventional” witness. The dissent raised several points in
support of this rather odd assertion. The analyst writing the
report was reporting near-contemporaneous observations.
Not really true, responded Justice Scalia—the report was
completed almost a week after performance of the tests—and
immaterial in any event: A witness can testify about
contemporaneous observances. The analyst who completed
the report did not observe the crime itself or “any human
action related to it.” But again, so what? No one would
deny, I suppose, that an observer who testifies to the state of
the crime scene after the fact is a witness for Confrontation
Clause purposes. She is reporting on information that may
help the trier of fact determine whether a crime was
committed and, if so, how. But the same is true of the lab
analyst who testifies that a given substance contains cocaine.
Finally, according to the dissent, the lab analyst is not
testifying in response to police interrogation. That assertion
is dubious at best: The lab analyst was responding to a police
request. But the broader response is yet again, so what? The
confrontation right is independent of, and much older than,
the institutions of a police force or a public prosecutor. It is
a right that the accused has with respect to the witness, and
if the witness makes her statement on her own initiative that
does not nullify the right.
The lab report was, Massachusetts contended, a product of
neutral, scientific testing, rather than an historical account
subject to distortion. Once more, Justice Scalia challenged
both the truth and the materiality of the premise. Lab testing,
while usually accurate, is far from foolproof. Nor can agents
of the government properly be called neutral in a criminal
prosecution. But beyond that, Crawford forbids a court from
trying to exempt species of evidence from the confrontation
right on the ground that they are reliable and so crossexamination is unlikely to be productive.
Massachusetts contended that the lab reports were akin to
business records and so exempt from the Confrontation
Clause. True, forensic lab reports are produced routinely—
but to say that this is sufficient to guarantee admissibility
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would only mean that the confrontation rights of the accused
are routinely violated. Forensic laboratory reports are
routinely produced for use in prosecution, and that is what
makes them testimonial. Statements genuinely falling within
the hearsay exception for business records are not prepared
for litigation purposes.6 But beyond that, a statement cannot
be exempted from the Confrontation Clause on the ground—
part of the rejected Roberts doctrine—that it fits within a
well-recognized hearsay exception. True, Crawford
suggested that business records are typically not testimonial
statements. But that was merely an empirical observation: If
a statement satisfies the requirements for the hearsay
exception, it will probably also be properly characterized as
non-testimonial. That is not at all the same thing as saying
that qualification as a business record means that the
statement is not testimonial.
Melendez-Diaz could have subpoenaed the lab analysts and
made them his own witnesses. But, as the Court emphasized,
that turns criminal procedure on its head. It is the
prosecution’s job, not the defense’s, to produce the witnesses
against the accused. The difference is not merely one of
formality; it is far better for the defense if the prosecution
produces its witness live and then the defense decides
whether and how to cross-examine, than if the prosecution
presents the testimony in written form and the defense can
examine the witness only by calling her to the stand as part
of his case.
The practical burden on the courts of requiring lab analysts
to testify, asserted those on the state side, would be
intolerable. Once again, Justice Scalia challenged both the
accuracy and the materiality of the premise. “[W]e may not
disregard [the Confrontation Clause] at our convenience,” he
wrote. Besides, he doubted the “dire predictions” of disaster:
“Perhaps the best indication that the sky will not fall [as a
result of the decision] is that it has not done so already.”
That is, Melendez-Diaz had no impact on those states that
6

E.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943), cited with
approval by Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538.
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already complied with the constitutional rule it required, and
those states had not been led to ruin.
The majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz was quite wonderful.
Point by point, it swept aside potential obstructions to the
confrontation right that should never have been erected. But I
confess that I found it disappointing in two respects. One was
that the opinion secured only five votes—and the four dissenters
seemed so ready to undercut Crawford severely, largely because
of misguided concern that the practical consequences of the
decision would be intolerable.
The other respect was perhaps less to my credit. At the time,
I had a petition for certiorari pending in Briscoe v. Virginia.
The petition contended that Virginia did not satisfy the
Confrontation Clause in providing that a lab certificate could be
admissible but the accused could present the analyst as his own
witness. The Melendez-Diaz decision, it appeared clear, had just
resolved this issue in our favor—great news for my clients, but
apparently precluding my hopes of arguing the issue in the
Supreme Court. I, like most observers, expected that the Court
would, as a matter of course, remand Briscoe to the Virginia
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz. It
was startling, therefore, when four days later the Court instead
simply granted certiorari. There was widespread speculation that
the four dissenters had decided to take Briscoe in hopes of
undercutting Melendez-Diaz. The speculation gained credence
from the fact that Justice David Souter, a member of the
majority, had announced his retirement and his prospective
successor, Sonia Sotomayor, was a former prosecutor.7 Once
again, state-side amici—including the United States, a majority
of the states, and the District of Columbia—raised the
catastrophic consequences that would occur if the defendant’s
position prevailed. But at the argument, it became quite clear
that Justice Sotomayor was not about to undermine a sevenmonth-old precedent. Two weeks later, the Court did what
7

During oral argument in Briscoe, Justice Scalia lent additional force to
the speculation, suggesting that the Court had taken the case for no reason
other than to consider overruling Melendez-Diaz. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 58, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 0711191).
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observers had expected it to do in the first place, remanding the
case for proceedings consistent with Melendez-Diaz.8
But, of course, the matter did not rest there. Nine months
later, the Court granted certiorari in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.
The Court’s makeup had shifted again—Justice Kagan had
replaced Justice Stevens, a member of the Melendez-Diaz
majority. In Bullcoming, unlike Melendez-Diaz and Briscoe, the
prosecution had presented a live witness from the laboratory,
rather than simply the report. But the witness was not the
analyst who had performed the test and prepared the report, for
he had been placed on unpaid administrative leave. I thought this
case was extremely easy—after all, in his Melendez-Diaz dissent,
Justice Kennedy noted that the Court had made clear that it “will
not permit the testimonial statement of one witness to enter into
evidence through the in-court testimony of a second . . . .”9
Perhaps for that reason, the United States did not appear as
amicus in support of the state. But thirty-three states did, as well
as organizations of prosecutors and medical examiners, and once
again they focused on the practical consequences that would
follow if the author of the report had to testify live.
Nevertheless, I hoped that some or all of the Melendez-Diaz
dissenters would acknowledge that the Court had decided that
forensic lab reports are testimonial statements, and that it
obviously followed that a surrogate witness could not testify as
to the contents of a lab report stating events and results that the
surrogates had not observed. In the end, Justice Kagan stayed
with the majority, which once again—this time in an opinion by
Justice Ginsburg—treated the case as virtually a foregone
conclusion. But the bloc of four dissenters remained intact. Once
again, Justice Kennedy took the lead, and this time some of his
language seemed to indicate that he was ready to throw out the
entire Crawford framework and return to something like that of
Roberts.

8
9

Briscoe, 130 S. Ct. at 1316.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2546 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS
Five days after the Bullcoming decision, the Court took one
more case involving forensic lab reports. Williams v. Illinois is
the first in the line that involves DNA testing, one of the most
complex types of forensic testing. It is also different from the
prior cases in two respects. First, an in-court witness used the
report in question, by a Cellmark lab, in part to formulate her
opinion that the DNA profile indicated on that report—taken
from a vaginal swab of the victim of a sexual assault—matched
that of the accused. Second, the Cellmark report was never
formally introduced into evidence. I do not believe that either of
these facts should make a difference. The Cellmark report
transmitted information that was important to link the accused to
the crime; the in-court expert’s opinion that the two profiles
matched would be worthless for the case if the Cellmark report
were inaccurate. And the essential substance of the Cellmark
report was conveyed to the trier of fact. Williams is pending as I
write this. I worry that if the state prevails, the Court will have
opened a broad path for manipulation around the Confrontation
Clause—not only in the context of forensic lab reports, but
generally. Any person whom a state is willing to designate as an
expert may be allowed to testify to her conclusions, and in doing
so she may convey to the trier of fact the substance of
testimonial statements on which she relied.
In Williams, the United States has returned as an amicus
favoring the state—as have forty-two other states, the District of
Columbia, Guam, and various prosecution-related agencies and
associations. This Essay focuses on the brief submitted by the
New York County District Attorney’s Office and the New York
10
City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner —what I will call
the New York brief—because it makes the most detailed and
aggressive assertions of impractical consequences that would
follow from a holding for Williams. Indeed, it appears to me
10

Brief for New York County District Attorney’s Office and New York
City Office of Chief Medical Examiner as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011) (No. 10-8505),
2011 WL 5125054 [hereinafter New York Brief].
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that the brief is in large part an attempt to scare the Supreme
Court into thinking that if Williams wins this case, prosecution
use of DNA and some other types of forensic evidence will
become unfeasible. That is simply not true.11
The New York brief builds on the fact that DNA testing
involves several different stages. It suggests that if Williams
prevails, a prosecutor wishing to present DNA evidence would
have to bring to court one witness for each stage. But that is not
so. At the outset, bear in mind that the Confrontation Clause
requires the presence at trial only of those persons who make
testimonial statements that are in some way conveyed to the trier
of fact. I use this phrasing because the Clause may be invoked
even if the prosecutor does not formally introduce the statement.
Consider the stages of DNA testing as described in the New
York brief:
(a) Examination: A technician “examines the sample and
takes cuttings for DNA extraction.”12 There is no
testimonial statement—or any statement at all—in this
process; examining and cutting do not constitute a
statement.
(b) Extraction: A technician adds reagents to the sample.
Again, the process does not involve a statement.
(c) Quantitation: A technician measures the amount of
DNA. Presumably this technician reports that amount.
But even assuming for purposes of argument that this
report is a testimonial statement, there is no need for it to
be presented to the trier of fact. The witness who reports
on the profile found in the later part of the process does
not have to convey it to the trier of fact, or even rely in
her own testimony on the results of this stage. We know
from the fact that, by hypothesis, a DNA profile was
ultimately found that there was enough DNA to perform
11

The discussion here is drawn in large part from an entry I posted on
the Confrontation Blog. Richard D. Friedman, Thoughts on the Brief of the
New York DA and OCME in Williams, CONFRONTATION BLOG (Dec. 5,
2011, 3:27 PM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/12/thoughts-onbrief-of-new-york-da-and.html.
12
New York Brief, supra note 10, at 7.
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the analysis. Put another way: The quantitation stage is a
screen, used to determine whether the process should
continue; once the process does continue, neither
subsequent analysts nor the trier of fact need rely on the
results of this stage.
(d) Amplification: A technician copies specific portions of
the DNA to raise them to sufficient levels for testing.
Once more, performance of this test is not a statement,
let alone a testimonial statement.
(e) Electrophoresis: Here, at last, we have the
performance of the test that yields the numbers and graph
from which a DNA profile may be deduced. The printout
of the machinery used to perform the test is not in itself a
testimonial statement. But presumably the printout bears
identifying information that was entered by a human, and
(assuming the test was clearly performed for forensic
purposes) that should be a testimonial statement. If, as in
Williams, an analyst at the lab deduces the profile of
interest and prepares a report presenting that profile, that
report is a testimonial statement, and thus provides the
essential information that the prosecution needs.13
Even assuming Williams wins and some labs continue to
adhere to the procedure described by the New York brief, the
Confrontation Clause would, at least presumptively, say nothing
about most of the technicians involved in that procedure. As a
check on this, try this thought experiment: Assume for the
moment that Williams wins his case. Would the signatories to
the New York brief contend in subsequent cases that all the
technicians in the procedure they have described have to testify
for DNA test results to be admissible? Not very likely.
Now, I have included the “at least presumptively”
qualification in the last paragraph because I have not yet said
anything about chain of custody. So long as a witness speaks
only about what she knows from personal knowledge, chain of
custody is not a confrontation problem per se. Melendez-Diaz
makes clear that, as an initial matter, it is up to the prosecution
to decide what witness’s statements it wishes to present to
13

Friedman, supra note 11.
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establish the chain of custody.14 If the gaps in the chain are too
great, there may be insufficient proof, and at some point that
could be a due process violation. It may be, depending on what
procedures the laboratory used to tag the sample and maintain
identification throughout the procedure, that to prevent such a
violation, the prosecution would have to present one or more
additional witnesses. But reasonable inferences can bridge even
some substantial gaps. I do not believe the sample needs to have
been sitting still during those gaps; technicians may have
performed procedures on it other than letting it change naturally
over time.
Consider also that, given the sensitivity of modern methods
of DNA testing, in most cases if the prosecution would have
difficulty bringing to court the lab witnesses necessary to prove
the results of a given test, it can simply ask for the sample to be
retested. This could be done perhaps by a single witness who
can easily come to court. Note, for example, that only one
technician from the Illinois State Police lab did the test on the
blood sample taken from Williams. Retesting would not be
necessary in the vast majority of cases, because so few cases go
to trial, but the availability of this option reduces the overall
burden on the state enormously.
The Illinois test in Williams serves as a reminder that the
Sixth Amendment does not incorporate the Cellmark protocol.
Much of the New York brief seems to suggest that
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence must take as given
procedures such as those used by Cellmark in Williams and
described by the brief. But other labs, like the one in Illinois,
use different procedures. For example, the Michigan State
Police lab rarely involves more than three people in a given
15
DNA test. Is such vertical integration less efficient than an
assembly-line procedure? Perhaps. But the standard for
constitutionality cannot be the procedure that would be optimal
when the constitutional rights of the accused are disregarded.

14
15

2011).

See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1.
Interview with John Collins, Director, Mich. State Police Lab. (Jan.
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THE PRACTICAL CONCERNS OF LIVE TESTIMONY
I do not mean to suggest—and I do not believe—that it is
inappropriate for the Supreme Court, in considering the bounds of
the Confrontation Clause, to pay some attention to the practical
consequences of its decision. Crawford has compelled the Court
to build a new structure, and I think it is fitting for the Court to
subject its tentative conclusions to a reality check. If the result of
its doctrines were to be a practical disaster, the Court should
think again; “the Constitution . . . is not a suicide pact.”16 But
disaster avoidance does not require optimal efficiency. And the
fact is that states that—like my own state of Michigan—use more
integrated procedures do not suffer unduly on that account.17
Indeed, in conjunction with Bullcoming, I supervised a study
of Michigan cases to determine how many lab witnesses actually
testify at trials. In rape cases in which DNA evidence was
presented, we found that an average of 1.24 lab witnesses
testified per trial.18 This strikes me as a very tolerable number,
given that DNA is a particularly complex form of laboratory
evidence. In drug cases, we found an average of .46 live lab
witnesses per trial, and about .55 live lab witnesses per test
presented. No more than one witness testified live with respect
to a given test.19 In driving-under-the-influence cases, an average
of about .55 lab witnesses per trial, and about .67 per test
presented, testified live.20
16

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
I made this point in a related context in an exchange with Justice
Scalia in the Briscoe argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21–22,
Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-11191).
18
Richard D. Friedman, Is There a Multi-Witness Problem with Respect
to Forensic Lab Tests?, CONFRONTATION BLOG (Dec. 7, 2010, 10:11 AM),
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-theremulti-witness-problem-with.html.
19
There were 71 live lab witnesses in 154 trials. Id. In 116 of the cases
lab results were presented, accounting for at least 128 tests—meaning that an
average of .55 lab witnesses per test testified at trial. Id.
20
There were 55 trials, in 41 of which lab results were presented, and a
total of 30 lab witnesses testified live. Id. There was a total of at least 45 lab
tests, meaning an average of .67 lab witnesses per test testified live at trial.
Id.
17
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This means that—despite the fears expressed by the MelendezDiaz dissenters—many Michigan defendants stipulate to the
admissibility of forensic lab evidence without the need for the
prosecution to bring in live testimony. Why is that so?21 The plus
side of demanding confrontation may appear minimal. Experience
may compel counsel to recognize that the lab reports will not be
excluded; the prosecution will ensure that any necessary lab
witnesses appear.22 Also, in some cases, the defense does not see
much likelihood of any worthwhile gains from cross-examination.
The negative side of demanding confrontation may appear
substantial. For example, the defense’s chance of reaching an
acceptable plea bargain may be substantially impaired if counsel
is perceived as game-playing in hopes of imposing costs on the
prosecution.23 The defense may regard a live, perhaps very
credible, prosecution witness as far worse than introduction of a
piece of paper or reading of a stipulation.
States that are concerned about cost can use other mechanisms
as well. Melendez-Diaz expressly approved simple notice-anddemand statutes, under which a prosecutor may give advance
notice of intent to introduce lab evidence, and the accused then
21

Some of the following discussion is drawn from my article, Richard
D. Friedman, Potential Responses to the Melendez-Diaz Line of Cases, 90
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 396 (Dec. 21, 2011).
22
It sometimes happens that defense counsel will demand that the lab
witness appear, believing that doing so is cost-free, and then stipulate to
admissibility of the report when the witness does appear. But this type of
game playing does not appear to be an insuperable problem, in part for the
reason stated in the text. A prosecutor concerned about it can further limit its
effect by announcing a policy—or simply informing counsel in the given
case—that if the accused demands that the witness appear live, and the
witness does in fact appear at trial prepared to testify, the prosecution will
then not stipulate to admissibility of a lab report but instead will insist that
the witness testify live. By hypothesis, the accused prefers admission of the
report to live testimony of the witness. Accordingly, such a policy might
make the accused hesitant to make the demand, especially where it appears
very probable that the witness would indeed appear if required to do so.
23
In his Melendez-Diaz dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that it would be
unprofessional for counsel to waive a client’s rights for fear of incurring
judicial displeasure. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2556
(2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). I am putting aside the possibility that
counsel would act in that way.
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waives objections to introduction of the lab report if he does not
make a timely demand for live testimony.24 These statues are valid
because, if the defense makes the demand, it is the prosecution
that (a) bears the risk that the witness does not appear at trial, and
(b) presents the witness’s live testimony as part of its case.
Indeed, in some contexts, a demand-only statute should also be
held constitutional. Under such a statute, the prosecution does not
have to give the accused notice of intent to offer a lab report in
prosecuting one of a prescribed list of crimes, such as those
involving drug possession. The use of such reports in
prosecutions of this type is so common that the accused is deemed
to be on notice from the fact that he is being prosecuted. As
under a notice-and-demand statute, if the accused wishes a live
witness to testify, he must make a timely demand, and if he does,
the prosecution must either present the live witness or forgo use
of the evidence. So long as (1) the statute is sufficiently clear as
to the consequences of failure to make a demand, and (2) the
crime is one for which use of a forensic lab report would not be
surprising, this type of statute should not be constitutionally
troublesome. Moreover, in my view, the legislature could validly
add to either a notice-and-demand or a demand-only statute a
requirement that the accused assert that he is not making the
demand simply to impose costs on the prosecution.
States might also ease the burden by adopting two
procedures for taking testimony of lab witnesses.25 First, at least
on consent of the accused, they might—as Michigan has begun
to do26—take an analyst’s testimony by televideo. Such a
procedure offers great efficiency, for the analyst could testify
from a studio adjoining her laboratory. Whether use of such a
procedure would be allowed over the objection of the accused is
27
doubtful. But, given that the accused often willingly does
24

See id. at 2541 (majority opinion).
Other techniques states may adopt, such as videotaping autopsies and
ensuring that a second examiner is present, are discussed in Friedman, supra
note 21.
26
State Police Receives Innovation Award, MICH. ST. POLICE (Dec. 9,
2008), http://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,4643,7-123-1586_1710-204770,00.
html.
27
For a brief analysis, see Friedman, supra note 21.
25
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without live testimony altogether, there is good reason to
suppose that he would often be willing to consent to testimony
by video transmission, so long as the quality of the transmission
is good enough to allow an opportunity for cross-examination
that is not significantly impaired.
Second, states may take depositions for the purpose of
preserving testimony. Ideally, the deposition should be videorecorded. If the witness is then unavailable to testify at trial, the
deposition may be admitted. Given that the accused has had an
opportunity to be confronted with the witness at the deposition,
courts should be rather lenient in declaring witnesses
unavailable, either because of their distance from the courthouse
or because of lack of memory of a test performed long before.
The laws of most states are extremely restrictive concerning
the circumstances when depositions may be taken. But those
laws can be changed, and they should be, because depositions
offer several advantages. A deposition may be scheduled to suit
the convenience of the witness and of the parties; the witness
need not wait through unpredictable trial proceedings to give her
testimony. Indeed, a lab witness can feasibly schedule several
depositions in one day, minimizing travel time—an important
consideration if the witness’s lab is some distance from the
courthouse. A deposition may also be held close to the time
when the test was performed, meaning that the witness will be
testifying with a memory that is fresher than at the time of trial.
A deposition also ensures against the possibility that the lab
analyst will be dead or otherwise unable to appear at trial.
Of course, if a deposition is held too early, it might be
wasteful, because the case probably would plead out before trial
(though the scheduling of the deposition might accelerate
negotiations). Also, early on, the defense might not know
enough about the case to conduct cross-examination adequately.
With respect to many types of lab reports, however, this will not
usually be a serious problem; defense counsel does not need to
know much about the case to know that it hurts the accused if
the prosecution can prove that a substance allegedly found in his
possession is high-quality cocaine. An accused should be
allowed to argue that in the particular circumstances of the case
the deposition was too early to satisfy his confrontation right—
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but, though occasionally such arguments are meritorious,28
courts should generally approach them with considerable
skepticism.
Even putting aside such relatively innovative responses as
remote testimony and greatly expanded use of depositions, the
bottom line remains: States that have conscientiously protected
the accused’s confrontation rights—allowing him to demand that
a lab witness must testify subject to confrontation if she has
made a testimonial statement that is conveyed to the trier of
fact—have not found the burden intolerable. There is no reason
to suppose that the other states would find adherence to the
Melendez-Diaz line so much more difficult if they tried it.
Instead of putting their energy into trying to undercut the
Melendez-Diaz doctrine, attorneys general, local prosecutors,
and other prosecution-related government agencies should do
what they can to make the doctrine work effectively. Some good
prosecutors have taken this approach virtually from the
beginning.29 I hope many more now join them.

28

In a recent case not involving a lab witness, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that a prior opportunity for cross-examination was inadequate in the
circumstances because defense counsel lacked sufficient information. People
v. Torres, No. 111302, 2012 WL 312119, at *14 (Ill. Feb. 2, 2012).
29
See, e.g., Patrick M. Haggan, Chief Trial Counsel, Suffolk Cnty.
Dist. Attorney’s Office, Remarks at the New England School of Law
Symposium: Confronting Forensic Evidence: Implications of Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts and Briscoe v. Virginia (Nov. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.nesl.edu/students/ne_journal_symposia_audio_2009.cfm.
Many of you may expect me to get up here today and say that, “the
sky is falling, this is horrible, this is horrible, we cannot do justice.”
Well, I’m here to say quite the opposite . . . . [B]ased upon the
efforts that have been made since the Melendez-Diaz decision, I can
say that I think it’s going to work out, and I think
especially . . . when it comes to drug cases, I’m quite confident that
our state and hopefully all states in the country are going to be able
to deal with Melendez-Diaz in an efficient, appropriate and just way,
to hold those accountable but also to afford the constitutional rights
to all defendants.
Id. Suffolk County includes the city of Boston, where Melendez-Diaz itself
arose.

